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CSE442TExam reviewsCSE442T Exam 1 Review

CSE442T Exam 1 Review

The exam will take place in class on Monday, October 21.

The topics will cover Chapters 1 and 2, as well as the related probability discussions we’ve had (caveats below).  Assignments 1 through 3 span this material.

Specifics on material:

NOT “match-making game” in 1.2 (seems fun though)

NOT the proof of Theorem 31.3 (but definitely the result!)

NOT 2.4.3 (again, definitely want to know this result, and we have discussed the idea behind it)

NOT 2.6.5, 2.6.6

NOT 2.12, 2.13

The probability knowledge/techniques I’ve expanded on include conditional probability, independence, law of total probability, Bayes’ Theorem, union bound, 1-p bound (or “useful bound”), collision

I expect you to demonstrate understanding of the key definitions, theorems, and proof techniques.  The assignments are designed to reinforce all of these.  However, exam questions will be written with the understanding of the time limitations.

The exam is “closed-book,” with no notes of any kind allowed.  The advantage of this is that some questions might be very basic.  However, I will expect that you will have not just memorized definitions and theorems, but you can also explain their meaning and apply them.

Chapter 1

Prove security

Definition 11.1 Shannon secrecy

(M,K,Gen,Enc,Dec)(\mathcal{M},\mathcal{K}, Gen, Enc, Dec) (A crypto-system) is said to be private-key encryption scheme that is Shannon-secrete with respect to distribution DD over the message space M\mathcal{M} if for all mMm'\in \mathcal{M} and for all cc,

P[kGen;mD:m=mEnck(m)=c]=P[mD:m=m]P[k\gets Gen;m\gets D:m=m'|Enc_k(m)=c]=P[m\gets D:m=m']

(The adversary cannot learn all, part of, any letter of, any function off, or any partial information about the plaintext)

Definition 11.2 Perfect Secrecy

(M,K,Gen,ENc,Dec)(\mathcal{M},\mathcal{K}, Gen, ENc, Dec) (A crypto-system) is said to be private-key encryption scheme that is perfectly secret if forall m1,m2M,cm_1,m_2\in \mathcal{M},\forall c:

P[kGen:Enck(m1)=c]=P[kGen:Enck(m2)=c]P[k\gets Gen:Enc_k(m_1)=c]=P[k\gets Gen:Enc_k(m_2)=c]

(For all coding scheme in the crypto system, for any two different message, they are equally likely to be mapped to cc)

Definition 12.3

A private-key encryption scheme is perfectly secret if and only if it is Shannon secret.

Chapter 2

Efficient Private-key Encryption

Definition 24.7

A triplet of algorithms (Gen,Enc,Dec)(Gen,Enc,Dec) is called an efficient private-key encryption scheme if the following holds.

  1. kGen(1n)k\gets Gen(1^n) is a p.p.t. such that for every nNn\in \mathbb{N}, it samples a key kk.
  2. cEnck(m)c\gets Enc_k(m) is a p.p.t. that given kk and m{0,1}nm\in \{0,1\}^n produces a ciphertext cc.
  3. mDecc(c)m\gets Dec_c(c) is a p.p.t. that given a ciphertext cc and key kk produces a message m{0,1}nm\in \{0,1\}^n\cup \perp.
  4. For all nN,m{0,1}nn\in \mathbb{N},m\in \{0,1\}^n
Pr[kGen(1n);Deck(Enck(m))=m]=1Pr[k\gets Gen(1^n);Dec_k(Enc_k(m))=m]=1

One-Way functions

Definition 26.1

A function f:{0,1}{0,1}f:\{0,1\}^*\to\{0,1\}^* is worst-case one-way if the function is:

  1. Easy to compute. There is a p.p.t CC that computes f(x)f(x) on all inputs x{0,1}x\in \{0,1\}^*, and
  2. Hard to invert. There is no adversary A\mathcal{A} such that
x,P[A(f(x))f1(f(x))]=1\forall x,P[\mathcal{A}(f(x))\in f^{-1}(f(x))]=1

Definition 27.2 Negligible function

A function ϵ(n)\epsilon(n) is negligible if for every cc. there exists some n0n_0 such that for all n>n0n>n_0, ϵ(n)1nc\epsilon (n)\leq \frac{1}{n^c}.

Definition 27.3 Strong One-Way Function

A function mapping strings to strings f:{0,1}{0,1}f:\{0,1\}^*\to \{0,1\}^* is a strong one-way function if it satisfies the following two conditions:

  1. Easy to compute. There is a p.p.t CC that computes f(x)f(x) on all inputs x{0,1}x\in \{0,1\}^*, and
  2. Hard to invert. There is no adversary A\mathcal{A} such that
P[x{0,1}n;yf(x):f(A(1n,y))=y]ϵ(n)P[x\gets\{0,1\}^n;y\gets f(x):f(\mathcal{A}(1^n,y))=y]\leq \epsilon(n)

Definition 28.4 (Weak One-Way Function)

A function mapping strings to strings f:{0,1}{0,1}f:\{0,1\}^*\to \{0,1\}^* is a strong one-way function if it satisfies the following two conditions:

  1. Easy to compute. There is a p.p.t CC that computes f(x)f(x) on all inputs x{0,1}x\in \{0,1\}^*, and
  2. Hard to invert. There is no adversary A\mathcal{A} such that
P[x{0,1}n;yf(x):f(A(1n,y))=y]11q(n)P[x\gets\{0,1\}^n;y\gets f(x):f(\mathcal{A}(1^n,y))=y]\leq 1-\frac{1}{q(n)}

Notation for prime numbers

Denote the (finite) set of primes that are smaller than 2n2^n as

Πn={qq<2n and q is prime}\Pi_n=\{q|q<2^n\textup{ and } q \textup{ is prime}\}

Assumption 30.1 (Factoring)

For every adversary A\mathcal{A}, there exists a negligible function ϵ\epsilon such that

P[pΠn;qΠn;Npq:A(N){p,q}]<ϵ(n)P[p\gets \Pi_n;q\gets \Pi_n;N\gets pq:\mathcal{A}(N)\in \{p,q\}]<\epsilon(n)

(For every product of random 2 primes, the probability for any adversary to find the prime factors is negligible.)

(There is no polynomial function that can decompose the product of two nn bit prime, the best function is 2O(n13log23n)2^{O(n^{\frac{1}{3}}\log^{\frac{2}{3}}n)})

Theorem 35.1

For any weak one-way function f:{0,1}n{0,1}f:\{0,1\}^n\to \{0,1\}^*, there exists a polynomial m()m(\cdot) such that function

f(x1,x2,,xm(n))=(f(x1),f(x2),,f(xm(n))).f'(x_1,x_2,\dots, x_{m(n)})=(f(x_1),f(x_2),\dots, f(x_{m(n)})).

from f=({0,1}n)m(n)({0,1})m(n)f'=(\{0,1\}^n)^{m(n)}\to(\{0,1\}^*)^{m(n)} is strong one-way.

RSA

Definition 46.7

A group GG is a set of elements with a binary operator :G×GG\oplus:G\times G\to G that satisfies the following properties

  1. Closure: a,bG,abG\forall a,b\in G, a\oplus b\in G
  2. Identity: iG\exists i\in G such that aG,ia=ai=a\forall a\in G, i\oplus a=a\oplus i=a
  3. Associativity: a,b,cG,(ab)c=a(bc)\forall a,b,c\in G,(a\oplus b)\oplus c=a\oplus(b\oplus c).
  4. Inverse: aG\forall a\in G, there is an element bGb\in G such that ab=ba=ia\oplus b=b\oplus a=i

Definition Euler totient function Φ(N)\Phi(N).

Φ(p)=p1\Phi(p)=p-1

if pp is prime

Φ(N)=(p1)(q1)\Phi(N)=(p-1)(q-1)

if N=pqN=pq and p,qp,q are primes

Theorem 47.10

aZN,aΦ(N)=1modN\forall a\in \mathbb{Z}_N^*,a^{\Phi(N)}=1\mod N

Corollary 48.11

aZp,ap11modp\forall a\in \mathbb{Z}_p^*,a^{p-1}\equiv 1\mod p.

Corollary 48.12

axmodN=axmodΦ(N)modNa^x\mod N=a^{x\mod \Phi(N)}\mod N

Some other important results

Exponent

(11n)ne(1-\frac{1}{n})^n\approx e

when nn is large.

Primes

Let π(x)\pi(x) be the lower-bounds for prime less than or equal to xx.

Theorem 31.3 Chebyshev

For x>1x>1,π(x)>x2logx\pi(x)>\frac{x}{2\log x}

Corollary 31.3

For 2n>12^n>1, p(n)>1np(n)>\frac{1}{n}

(The probability that a uniformly sampled n-bit integer is prime is greater than 1n\frac{1}{n})

Modular Arithmetic

Extended Euclid Algorithm

def eea(a,b)->tuple(int): # assume a>b # return x,y such that ax+by=gcd(a,b)=d. # so y is the modular inverse of b mod a # so x is the modular inverse of a mod b # so gcd(a,b)=ax+by if a%b==0: return (0,1) x,y=eea(b,a%b) return (y,x-y(a//b))
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